


# MONOPOLY:

## Competitive Market

- price takers
- many firms
- linear  $Q_w$
- $P = MC$  ( $\pi = 0$ )

Same price for all  $Q$



Price discrimination  
( $P = WTP$ )


Price changes w/  $Q$

## Monopoly

- set  $P$  or  $Q$
- one firm
- non-linear  $Q_w$
- $P > MC$
- $\pi > 0$

if set  $Q$   
if set  $P$

\* constrained by demand




### Monopolist Problem (max $\pi$ )

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Max}_Q \pi &= R(Q) - c(Q) \\ &= \underline{P(Q)} \times Q - \underline{c(Q)} \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{FOC: } \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial Q} = \frac{\partial R}{\partial Q} - \frac{\partial c}{\partial Q} = 0$$

Marginal Revenue

Marginal Cost



∴ we want  $Q^m$  s.t.  $MR = MC$

\* Optimality Condition \*

$$\frac{\partial (f(x) - g(x))}{\partial x}$$

$$\rightarrow MR(Q) = \frac{\partial [P(Q) \cdot Q]}{\partial Q}$$

$$= \frac{\partial P(Q)}{\partial Q} Q + P(Q)$$


$$= P \left( \frac{1}{\epsilon} + 1 \right) = P \left( 1 - \frac{1}{|\epsilon|} \right)$$

$MR = MC$

$$\therefore MC = P \left( 1 - \frac{1}{|\epsilon|} \right)$$

$$\Rightarrow MC < P \quad * (+) \pi *$$

Linear example



$$\rightarrow P = a - bQ \quad \text{TC} \quad \pi(Q) = P(Q)Q - C(Q)$$

$$C(Q) = cQ \quad (a - bQ)Q - cQ$$

$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial Q} = a - 2bQ - c = 0$$

$$a - c = 2bQ$$

$$Q^m = \frac{a - c}{2b}$$

⇒  $Q^m$  into demand curve:


$$P^m = a - b \left( \frac{a-c}{2b} \right) = \frac{2a - (a-c)}{2} = \frac{a+c}{2}$$

• Inefficiencies of monopoly

↳  $P > MC$  ∴ consumers worse off


Total economic surplus under P.C is the max

under monopoly  
 $P^m > P^*$   
 $Q^m < Q^*$



• natural monopolies (joint, exclusive rights, reliable)

FC is high  
 MC is small  $\ll FC$




⇒ in PC optimal not possible b/c  $P < AC$   
 ∴ need to charge  $> P^*$   
 ↳ leads to natural monopoly  
 $P^{AC} > P^*$   
 $Q^{AC} > Q^*$

↳ minimum efficient scale (MES) - level of  $Q$  that min  $AC = MC$

• Taxes :  $mc + t$   $\therefore P \uparrow$

• Price discrimination (1) First order - charge WTP  $\therefore CS = 0$   
(2) Second order - charge diff price for different groups ( $\downarrow CS^*$ )

• Lantl :  $P = mc \Leftrightarrow \boxed{\pi \text{ from entry fee}}$



(Q1)  $P = a - bQ$   $P(Q)$   
 $MC = Q$

2,3,4

1) Revenue =  $P \cdot Q = (a - bQ)Q$

2)  $MR = \frac{dR}{dQ} = a - 2bQ$

3)  $\pi$  max  $Q^m$

$MR = MC$

$a - 2bQ = Q$

$a = Q(1 + 2b)$

$Q^m = \frac{a}{1 + 2b}$


plug into demand curve

$$\frac{(1 + 2b)a - bQ}{1 + 2b}$$

4)  $P^m = a - b \left( \frac{a}{1 + 2b} \right)$

$$= \frac{a + ab}{1 + 2b}$$

5)  $A = 10$      $Q^m = 2$   
 $B = 2$      $P^m = 6$



7)  $P^*, Q^*$  ?  $MC = P$

$$10 - 2Q = Q$$

$$Q = \frac{10}{3} \approx 3.33$$

$$P = \frac{10}{3}$$

(Q2)  $Q^d = 500 - P \Rightarrow P = 500 - Q$   
 $TC = 4Q^2$

1)  $Q^m$   $P^m$  ?

$5000 - Q^2$

$MR = MC$   
 $\frac{2(500 - Q)(Q)}{2Q} = \frac{2(4Q^2)}{2Q}$

$500 - 2Q = 8Q$

$Q^m = 50$

$P^m = 500 - Q^m$   
 $= 450$

2)  $AC$  c  $eq^m$   $Q$

$AC = 4Q$   
 $= 4(50)$   
 $= 200$

$\frac{TC}{Q} =$

3)  $\pi^m$  ?

$\pi = TR - TC$

$= (500 - Q)Q - 4Q^2$

$= 500Q - 5Q^2$

$= 12500$



For each unit

OR

$\pi / \text{unit} \Rightarrow P - AC$

$= 450 - 200$

$= 250$

↳ for all  $Q$  ( $Q \times 250$ )

$= 12,500$

# that we are producing

per unit  $\pi$

$$(Q3) \quad Q^d = 200 - P \Rightarrow P = 200 - Q$$

$$(0 < MC < 200) \Rightarrow$$

$Q^m = P^m$ ? How do they change w/ MC

$$TR = (200 - Q)Q \Rightarrow MR = 200 - 2Q$$

$$TC = c \times Q \Rightarrow MC = c$$

$$MR = MC$$

$$200 - 2Q = c$$

$$\downarrow Q^m = 100 - \frac{c}{2} \uparrow \quad \uparrow P^m = 100 + \frac{c}{2} \uparrow$$

$\Rightarrow$  the higher the MC,  $\downarrow Q^m$   
 $\uparrow P^m$

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &\Rightarrow 100 - \frac{0}{2} = 100 \\ &Q^m \\ P^m &= 100 + \frac{0}{2} = 100 \\ 200 &\Rightarrow 100 - \frac{200}{2} = 0 \\ &Q^m \\ &P^m = 100 + \frac{200}{2} = 200 \end{aligned}$$

(Q4)  $\epsilon = -2$   
 $P^m = 8$

mc = ?

Special demand

$Q^d = KP^r \Rightarrow P = \left(\frac{Q}{K}\right)^{\frac{1}{r}}$

$TR = \left(\frac{Q}{K}\right)^{\frac{1}{r}} \cdot Q = \frac{1}{K}^{\frac{1}{r}} \cdot Q^{\frac{1}{r} + 1}$

$MR = \left(\frac{1}{K}\right)^{\frac{1}{r}} \left(\frac{1}{r} + 1\right) Q^{\frac{1}{r}} \Rightarrow MR = P \left(\frac{1}{r} + 1\right)$

$= 8 \left(\frac{-1}{2} + 1\right)$

$= 4$

$\therefore MR = 4 = MC$

Showed in lecture